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ABSTRACT
Scholars in social psychology and criminology have long argued that deviance is a group
phenomenon. Based on the collective deviance literature, we aim to investigate the mechanisms
behind deviant behaviors among people in groups, uncovering reasons for collective deviance
within organizations. We are performing case studies among work groups (teams and
departments) that commit deviances by interviewing employees and managers from those
groups. Preliminary findings suggest that several deviances are committed by workgroups and, in
most cases, the group’s members are aware they are violating security policies, although their
intention is to increase work performance. Furthermore, in some cases, the IT department knows
about the deviance, but do not take action to try solving the issue. Understanding employees’
behavior toward collective deviance can aid to cope with IS policy violations, providing new
insights into policies development and strategies to mitigate such behaviors and increase
information security.
Keywords: collective deviance, IS deviant behavior, information security, shadow IT.
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INTRODUCTION
Groups of employees, such as teams or departments, are autonomously implementing and
using technologies to perform their work tasks that deviate from IS security policies. A sales
department, for example, implements Salesforce to be used by all employees in their daily
activities and provide good services for clients and external partners. This implementation is led
by the manager of the sales department, but without permission and support from the
organizational IT department and violating IS security policies.
In decades of digitization, cases as the one described above have been recurrent in many
companies. The massive development of technology has also brought several opportunities for
deviant behavior in society and within organizations (Rogers et al. 2006). Not only technologies
are widely available nowadays, but also individuals are able to autonomously find new solutions
and exploit the functionalities it provides (e.g., Carter and Gruver 2015), leading to the use of
unauthorized technologies in the workplace that violates security policies and threaten the
organization (e.g., Haag and Eckhardt 2017). Thereby, it is essential to know what aspects lead
to higher organizational compliance, but can be even more relevant to understand why people
deviate from IS security policies. While there are many studies in the IS field on why people
comply with IS policies (e.g., Bulgurcu et al. 2010) that are designed for protecting
organizational IT assets, just a small number of articles investigate why people deviate or violate
security policies, and even fewer studies take a group-level perspective to investigate deviance.
Studies in social psychology and criminology (e.g., Gardner and Steinberg 2005;
McGloin and Piquero 2009; McGloin and Thomas 2016) have shown that most offense,
misbehavior, deviance or even crime has been conducted in groups, referring to this phenomenon
as collective deviance or co-offending. Taken that perspective to management research, we can
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argue that the possibility of individual non-compliance is even more likely if an individual is part
of a group, where all or at least a majority of the group members perform the same noncompliant action, such as using an information system that is not allowed by organizational IS
policies, a phenomenon that some researchers label as shadow IT usage (e.g., Haag and Eckhardt
2017).
Considering the above arguments, the following research questions emerge: How these
group processes occur and why they lead to collective deviance? This research aims, thus, to
investigate the mechanisms behind the deviant behaviors among people in groups, uncovering
reasons for collective deviance within organizations, which has not yet received sufficient
attention in IS literature.
By understanding deviant behavior of employees within organizations, we can provide
contributions for information security community. Investigating employees’ behavior toward
collective deviance can aid to cope with IS policy violations, providing new insights into policies
development and strategies to mitigate such behaviors and increase information security.
COLLECTIVE DEVIANCE
Most studies on deviant behavior, or simply deviance, come from sociology, psychology
and criminology literature. Deviance has been defined as conduct that violates social rules or
norms, and a deviant then defined as a person who has engaged in such conduct, either habitually
or occasionally (Wells 1978). Acts also can be considered deviant according to the reaction to
them by others, which tend to compare a particular act with alternative behaviors to define if it is
desirable or acceptable (Akers et al. 1979). Specific forms of deviant behavior can be crime,
delinquency, drug addiction, suicide, etc.
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The act of committing the deviance in groups has been referred as collective deviance or
co-offending. Collective deviance or co-offending embraces the actual collective execution of an
offense, that is, a violation of a law or rule, an illegal act (e.g., Weerman 2003). Studies have
shown that being in a group can produce significant changes in behavior, including a tendency
for people to demonstrate a shift toward risky or deviant behavior when in the presence of others
(e.g., Gardner and Steinberg 2005; McGloin and Thomas 2016). In that sense, researchers have
used group processes to understand and explain crime and other forms of deviance.
According to a model of collective behavior proposed by Granovetter’s (1978), an
individual’s belief about whether an act will maximize his utility is conditional on the behavior
of others, that is, others’ actions serve as situational contingencies affecting decision-making.
The subjective perceptions regarding rewards, informal social costs, and sanction risks vary
under group conditions (McGloin and Thomas 2016). Moreover, an individual’s decision to
engage in a collective action depends in part on how many others participate in that action
(Granovetter 1978; McGloin and Piquero 2009). Thus, the decision to participate in collective
deviance may be conditional on the behavior of others because the anticipated experience of
formal sanctions, social costs, and rewards are conditional on the individuals’ behavior engaged
on that deviant act (Gardner and Steinberg 2005; McGloin and Thomas 2016).
Introducing the concept of collective deviance in management and IS
Few studies on management field approach deviance as a group phenomenon. The
concept of workplace deviance proposed by Robinson and Bennett (1995) can be insightful here.
Those authors define employee workplace deviance as voluntary behavior that violates
significant organizational norms and in so doing threatens the well-being of an organization
and/or its members. They also highlight that the study of workplace deviance is distinct from the
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study of ethics because in the first case the focus is on behavior that violates organizational
norms, while the second case focus on behavior that is right or wrong when judged in terms of
justice and law (Robinson and Bennett 1995). Therefore, although a certain behavior can be both
deviant and unethical, the two qualities are not necessarily linked.
In the IS literature, most studies on deviance are from security and IS policy violation
literature. Crossler et al. (2013), for instance, labeled as deviant behavior those acts that are
intentional, such as sabotage, stealing, and industrial or political espionage, and those that are
unintentional, are called misbehavior such as selecting a simple password or clicking on phishing
links on emails. Siponen and Vance (2010), in turn, rely their analysis on the concept of Akers
and Sellers (2004), also from criminology literature, to explain deviance as any deviant behavior
that violates social norms, whether or not such behavior also violates the law. Here is taking into
account the difference between deviant and unethical behavior (Robinson and Bennett, 1995).
Studies on security and IS policy violation discuss a wide range of deviances, such as
using another person’s password without authorization, using or writing a virus, sending
confidential information unencrypted, using laptops carelessly outside of the company, among
others (e.g., Siponen and Vance 2010). However, it is not only dishonest employees that try to
commit computer crime or unmotivated employees who put security in risk by doing careless
actions (e.g., Warkentin and Willison 2009) because the reasons and motivations behind
deviance can be more complex, mainly when we consider a group of people acting together.
As discussed above, it is well documented that most misbehavior, deviance or even crime
has been conducted in groups. In line with previous research in the social psychology and
criminology (e.g., McGloin and Thomas 2016), we integrate the group deviance and collective
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behavior literature to understand how group processes affect behavior in the IS field as a way to
explain security deviant behavior, such as shadow IT usage, within organizations.
METHOD
Our method consists of an exploratory multiple case study based on a qualitative
approach. A case study is a detailed and empirical investigation that considers the real context
and multiple variables of a recent, broad, and complex phenomenon and it is useful when a
holistic and in-depth investigation is needed (Yin 2009, Dubé and Paré 2003).
In order to obtain a rich set of data that captures the contextual complexity, we are
performing interviews based on an interview guide with open questions among managers and
employees of different work groups (teams or departments) from several companies that deviate
from IS security policies. Notes and direct observation are also being considered to capture
contextual relevant factors since a multiple data collection techniques and sources are important
for data triangulation (Yin 2009). We defined a priori based on literature constructs and
categories to ensure that important issues are not overlooked, and to guide the interpretation
when conducting theory-building research (Dubé and Paré 2003).
FIRST INSIGHTS AND EXPECTED CONTRIBUTIONS
We are investigating two cases of security policies deviance from different companies so
far, performing interviews with employees from these workgroups. The first case (C1) is a sales
department leading by the manager of the department that implemented Salesforce with its own
budget. C1 is from a large company from the publishing industry that operates in the national
and international market. The organizational IT department is aware of the unauthorized tool
used by the sales department. “I use Salesforce to consolidate sales information and it is really
useful for us (department). We know it does not have permission and support from the IT
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department so if we have a problem with the solution we have to solve by ourselves”, said the
respondent, who is a sales executive of the department.
The second case (C2) is a team of the marketing department that downloaded on
company’s devices Skype application to communicate with clients and external partners,
including the manager of this team. C2 is from a multinational company from the IT industry
that has rigorous IS security policy. The IT department is not aware of Skype usage, and the
official technology they provide for communication does not meet the team’s demands,
according to the team’s members. “Many people that I have to communicate when performing
my work tasks are externals, like clients and partners, and the instant communication would be
impossible without Skype that is a common tool, everybody uses, and provides qualified
resources,” said the respondent who is a marketing assistant in this team. To install the
application on company's computers, they need admin rights, which should be provided by the
IT department. However, the respondent did not know to answer how all employees from her
team succeed when installing Skype. Although the company has strict security policies, the
employees do not seem to be concerned with formal punishments from the organization. “I need
to talk very often with external people in my work, so I depend on Skype to do it faster,” argues
the respondent. Perform work tasks and meet the goals seems to be more relevant to the team
than any risk of punishment from their company.
Next steps we plan to expand the interviews by interviewing more employees from Case
1 and 2, as well as investigating more cases of collective deviance in other companies. We
designed our investigation based on three primary elements. First, a person or people in the
group that instigated the deviant act, seeking to understand how and who starts the deviance
(e.g., Weerman 2003). Second, the perceptions of punishments, examining the influence of
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formal punishments from organizations and the IT department compared to social punishment
and informal social costs from group members, such as disapproval or exclusion (e.g., McGloin
and Thomas 2016). Third, the role of the IT department regarding the deviance since some
respondents reported that IT department knows about the deviant act.
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to investigate information security
deviance as a group phenomenon, taking as a theoretical background the collective behavior and
group deviance literature to explain work deviance in IS field. In that sense, we bring
contributions to security community by investigating the collective deviant behavior of
employees and providing new insights into policies development and strategies to cope with IS
policy violations and increase information security within organizations (Warkentin and Willison
2009; Haag and Eckhardt 2017).
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